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‘The Lord came down to see the city and the tower the people were building. The 
Lord said, “If as one people speaking the same language they have begun to do 
this, then nothing they plan to do will be impossible for them.”’ 
 
 — Genesis 11: 5–6 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice proclaims that 
the Court shall apply ‘international conventions’, ‘international custom’, ‘the 
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’, and as a subsidiary 
means for the determination of the rules of law, ‘judicial decisions and the 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists’. Although expressly framed as 
a list of applicable law in disputes before the International Court of Justice 
(‘ICJ’) and not as an exhaustive list of the sources of international law, 
generations of law students have been taught that the sources of international law 
can be found simply by reading art 38. Armed with this succinct menu, graduates 
sally forth into international legal practice where they find that the neat world of 
art 38 is a fiction. 
For upon entering international legal practice in almost any field it is readily 
apparent that art 38 misses entire categories of norms that international lawyers 
and states appear to treat as if they have some legal consequence. In some cases, 
international lawyers try to resolve this tension by describing putative legal 
norms as customary international law, despite implausible evidence as to the 
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state practice and opinio juris that accompany them.1 In other instances, 
instruments are described as ‘soft law’, suggesting that they have some legal 
qualities while lacking others.2 Some of these soft law norms are created by  
non-governmental organisations, meaning that under traditional state-centric 
theories of international law they cannot be binding law.3 Yet many, if not most, 
lawyers have the intuition that, despite the traditional doctrine of sources,  
juris-generation is no longer the sole province of the state.4 Some scholars have 
thus produced theories to explain the normative force of new kinds of quasi-legal 
rules,5 while others have emphatically pushed back and argued for the 
preservation of traditional and strict notions of what constitutes ‘law’.6 
Into this cacophony enters Jean d’Aspremont, an associate professor of 
international law at the Centre for International Law at the University of 
Amsterdam. His book, Formalism and the Sources of International Law,7 builds 
on his earlier work published in the European Journal of International Law8 and 
the Finnish Yearbook of International Law,9 among other places.10 
                                                 
 1 See Daniel Bodansky, ‘Prologue to a Theory of Non-Treaty Norms’ in  
Mahnoush H Arsanjani et al (eds), Looking to the Future: Essays on International Law in 
Honor of W Michael Reisman (Martinus Nijhoff, 2010) 119; Hiram E Chodosh,  
‘Neither Treaty nor Custom: The Emergence of Declarative International Law’ (1991)  
26 Texas International Law Journal 87. 
 2 See, eg, Kenneth W Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International 
Governance’ (2000) 54 International Organization 421. 
 3 See, eg, Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin, The Making of International Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2007) 89 (listing examples of soft law instruments promulgated by  
non-state actors, including: International Law Association, The Helsinki Rules on the Uses 
of the Waters of International Rivers and Comments (Paper presented at the  
52nd Conference, Helsinki, 1966); Note Verbale Dated 86/12/05 from the Permanent 
Mission of the Netherlands to the United Nations Office at Geneva Addressed to the Centre 
For Human Rights, UN ESCOR, 43rd sess, Agenda Items 8 and 18, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/1987/17 (8 January 1987) annex (‘The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’); ‘The Maastricht 
Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1998) 20 Human Rights 
Quarterly 691, 693–4; Stephen Macedo (ed), The Princeton Principles on Universal 
Jurisdiction (Princeton, 2001)).  
 4 See, eg, Boyle and Chinkin, above n 3, 41–5 (discussing the increasing role of non-state 
actors in international lawmaking and the literature thereon). 
 5 See, eg, David M Trubek et al, ‘“Soft Law”, “Hard Law” and EU Integration’ in  
Gráinne de Búrca and Joanne Scott (eds), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US 
(Hart Publishing, 2006) 65, 66–7. See also Orly Lobel, ‘The Renew Deal: The Fall of 
Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought’ (2004)  
89 Minnesota Law Review 342, 394–5, discussing the use of soft law in international law to 
accomplish what cannot be accomplished through traditional legal pathways. 
 6 See, eg, Prosper Weil, ‘Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?’ (1983)  
77 American Journal of International Law 413, 415 n 7: ‘sublegal obligations are neither 
“soft law” nor “hard law”: they are simply not law at all’. 
 7 Jean d’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law: A Theory of the 
Ascertainment Of Legal Rules (Oxford University Press, 2011). 
 8 Jean d’Aspremont, ‘Softness in International Law: A Self-Serving Quest for New Legal 
Materials — A Rejoinder to Tony D’Amato’ (2009) 20 European Journal of International 
Law 911; Jean d’Aspremont, ‘Softness in International Law: A Self-Serving Quest for New 
Legal Materials’ (2008) 19 European Journal of International Law 1075.  
 9 Jean d’Aspremont, ‘The Foundations of the International Legal Order’ (2007)  
18 Finnish Yearbook of International Law 219.  
 10 See, eg, Jean d’Aspremont, ‘The Doctrinal Illusion of Heterogeneity of International 
Lawmaking Processes’ in Hélène Ruiz-Fabri, Rüdiger Wolfrum and Jana Gogolin (eds), 
Select Proceedings of the European Society of International Law: 2008 (Hart  
Publishing, 2010) vol 2, 297.  
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The book is a greatly welcome addition to the literature on the sources of 
international law. Drawing on both general and international legal theory, 
d’Aspremont develops a formalist theory of how linguistic indicators can and 
should be used to identify legal norms and distinguish them from non-legal 
norms. The book is divided into eight chapters. The early chapters introduce the 
study and defend a formalist approach to identifying legal norms, while the 
middle chapters explore the intellectual history of formalism in legal thought and 
international legal thought in particular. Later chapters examine critiques of 
formalism and the deformalisation of sources of international law. The final two 
chapters present d’Aspremont’s theory of formal ‘law-ascertainment’ (or as I 
shall sometimes refer to it, identification) — an approach to determining whether 
a particular instrument or norm gives rise to legal obligations. 
D’Aspremont’s book is ambitious in scope; part intellectual history and part 
legal theory. In this essay, I shall focus on a few key points. My main objective 
is to connect d’Aspremont’s application of general legal theory, based on H L A 
Hart’s social thesis and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s theory of communitarian 
semantics, to institutionalist thinking in international law. Although perhaps not 
obviously connected at first blush, d’Aspremont’s theory of  
law-identification — if extended beyond the formal dichotomy between law and 
non-law on which he places his emphasis to encompass broader notions of how 
states signal their commitments to each other — opens the door to what I refer to 
as a communicative theory of international law. In short, d’Aspremont’s theory 
of law-identification explains how states shape each other’s expectations about 
how they will behave in the future. In institutionalist theories of international 
law, as in d’Aspremont’s theory, these expectations — rather than the intent of 
the parties that is the cornerstone of jurisprudential approaches to international 
law — are critical. States apply sanctions to each other when their legal 
expectations are disappointed rather than when a state fails to honour its 
intentions. How states communicate with each other is thus a critical aspect of 
institutionalist theory, because it explains how states translate their intentions — 
the traditional focus of jurisprudence — into expectations; the critical aspect of 
an institutionalist theory of international law. D’Aspremont’s descriptive account 
of how legal language is formed and used to indicate commitment suggests a 
research agenda focused on the use of language in legal instruments as a means 
of testing broader ideas about how states design international instruments and the 
role of reputation in international law. 
In Part II, I shall briefly review the book’s key arguments, focusing on the 
defence of formalism in law-identification, the putative need to have a sharp 
distinction between law and non-law and the workings of d’Aspremont’s theory 
of formal law-ascertainment. In Part III(A), I shall consider whether the defence 
of formalism and the alleged need for a sharp distinction between law and  
non-law is compelling in light of research from behaviouralist and institutionalist 
perspectives on how ambiguity can increase the effectiveness of the law. In  
Part III(B), I shall argue that d’Aspremont’s theory of law-identification, when 
expanded beyond the narrow context in which d’Aspremont applies it, helps fill 
a significant gap in institutionalist thinking about how international law 
structures articulate incentives to comply with the law. Specifically, the theory of 
law-identification laid out in Formalism and the Sources of International Law 
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offers an explanation of how states communicate, or fail to communicate, 
expectations to each other. This account of communication between states fills 
an important gap in institutionalist theories of international law. 
II THE ROLE OF FORMALISM IN FINDING INTERNATIONAL LAW 
In 1955, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht wrote that ‘the absence of agreed rules 
partaking of a reasonable degree of certainty is a serious challenge to the legal 
nature of what goes by the name of international law’.11 This quotation captures 
an intuition felt by many international lawyers — that an essential task of 
international lawyers is to say what the law is. The goal of clarifying the law is 
often associated with international lawmaking processes and institutions, from 
dispute resolution to the codification of customary international law.12 
By defending his call for a renewed formalism in identifying international 
legal norms on the grounds that formalism reduces ambiguity and indeterminacy 
in the law, d’Aspremont is thus in good company. He argues that 
some elementary formal law-ascertainment in international law [is] a necessary 
condition to preserve the normative character of international law, in that 
uncertainty regarding the existence of international legal rules prevents them from 
providing for meaningful commands.13 
He goes on to argue that, in the absence of formal identification criteria, 
actors cannot anticipate the effects of rules and thus legal rules ‘fall short of 
generating any change in the behaviour of its addressees’.14 D’Aspremont thus 
calls for ‘the preservation of the distinction between law and non-law’ and the 
use of formal indicators to mark the boundary between the two15 in order to 
further the effectiveness of international law, which is to say its ability to change 
state behaviour by inducing states to try to comply with legal rules.16 In short, he 
believes that clarity promotes effectiveness. 
Formalism itself is hardly a self-defining term. The early chapters of the book 
are devoted to reviewing the history of formalism, its different conceptions and 
its critics (in both general and international legal theory). In the interest of space, 
I will not discuss at length the very comprehensive and illuminating review of 
the intellectual and philosophical history of formalism that d’Aspremont offers. 
Suffice it to say that these chapters should be required reading for anyone 
interested in the origins of contemporary debates about the sources of 
                                                 
 11 Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘Codification and Development of International Law’ (1955)  
49 American Journal of International Law 16, 19. 
 12 See, eg, Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise (Longmans, Green and Co, 1905) 
vol 1, 39–43; Timothy Meyer, ‘Codifying Custom’ (2012) 160 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 995. For an argument that non-compliance with legal rules may stem from 
ambiguity and imprecision, see Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New 
Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (Harvard University 
Press, 1995). 
 13 D’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law, above n 7, 29–30 
(emphasis altered). 
 14 Ibid 30. D’Aspremont also grounds his call for formalism on a need for lawyers to maintain 
their authority within the norm-making and political processes, to promote coherent 
scholarly debates about international rules and indeed to make a critique of international law 
possible, and to promote rule of law values: at 31–6.  
 15 Ibid 5. 
 16 Ibid 30–1. 
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international legal rules. Particularly noteworthy is Chapter 5, which discusses 
some possible agendas behind efforts to deformalise international law, including: 
efforts to expand international law’s reach; to solve accountability problems 
thought to arise from the pluralism of international norm-creation; a ‘self-serving 
quest for new legal materials’;17 and, of course, advocacy by counsel in 
international judicial proceedings who use the deformalisation of  
law-ascertainment as a way to expand the set of possible rules at the service of 
their clients.18 Although one might wish that d’Aspremont had developed the 
nuances of these motivations a bit more,19 this discussion challenges the reader, 
particularly the reader interested in soft law or customary international law, to 
think about how and why she deploys the theory of the sources of international 
law.  
D’Aspremont himself adopts a definition of formalism based on the so-called 
‘source thesis’, which ‘provides that law is ascertained by its pedigree defined in 
formal terms and that, as a result, identifying a norm as a legal norm boils down 
to a formal pedigree test’.20 He modifies the ‘source thesis’ with reference to  
H L A Hart’s social thesis, under which the formal indicators — the pedigree a 
rule must have to be deemed legal — are determined by ‘the converging practice 
of law-applying authorities’.21 Following Brian Tamanaha’s work,22 
d’Aspremont adopts an expansive notion of what constitutes a law-applying 
authority, including judges, non-state actors and legal scholars.23 D’Aspremont 
therefore argues that the indicators that should be used to identify legal norms 
are not determined independently of legal practice, but rather emerge (and in his 
view, hopefully converge) organically from the practice of international legal 
actors.24 
                                                 
 17 Ibid 133. 
 18 Ibid 130–4. 
 19 In particular, d’Aspremont’s discussion of a ‘self-serving quest for new legal materials’ 
suggests that competition among international legal scholars to distinguish themselves has 
driven legal scholars to expand the bounds of what is considered law for reasons of 
professional advancement, rather than out of an intellectual conviction that new forms of 
international ordering should be studied alongside law. While there is no doubt some truth in 
what d’Aspremont says, there is a less cynical view of this phenomenon. Much of non-legal 
or quasi-legal ordering could easily be structured as ‘law’ if the parties generating the norms 
so wished. For example, social norms could be embedded in enforceable contracts or 
enacted as statutes, while non-binding international agreements could be made binding. 
Thus, for those scholars interested in the design of legal systems, studying traditional 
international law alongside new forms of ‘non-law’, to use d’Aspremont’s term, is necessary 
because the attribute of interest — formal legality — is endogenous. Put differently, to 
understand why a norm is a formal legal norm requires studying the comparative 
considerations that went into structuring the norm as such. 
 20 D’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law, above n 7, 13.  
 21 Ibid 201. See also H L A Hart, Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political 
Theory (Clarendon Press, 1982). 
 22 Brian Z Tamanaha, A General Jurisprudence of Law and Society (Oxford University  
Press, 2001). 
 23 D’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law, above n 7, 203.  
 24 Ibid 13–15. He carefully distinguishes formalism in law-ascertainment from the evidentiary 
process that may be associated with proving a rule exists and the process of interpreting a 
rule. Evidentiary procedures involve proving, for example, the existence of a document 
alleged to contain a legal rule or a conversation alleged to have created a contract. Whether 
a legal rule actually arises from the document or conversation is the subject of  
law-ascertainment. Only after a rule has been ascertained can its content be interpreted.  
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Although one can imagine different kinds of indicators emerging from social 
practice, d’Aspremont focuses on the role of linguistic indicators.25 His theory is, 
in essence, a theory of how international legal actors can and should 
communicate with each other and of the benefits of developing a common legal 
language to signal legal commitment. Determining what constitutes the 
‘convergences of the practice of law-applying authorities’26 is an exercise in 
communitarian semantics, derived from the philosophy of language and 
particularly Wittgenstein’s work. On this account, rules (including rules of 
recognition) are specific to the social contexts in which they emerge.27 The 
meaning of a rule is determined by ‘the conduct of the social group’.28  
D’Aspremont’s theory is thus both a descriptive account of how international 
legal actors to develop a set of shared linguistic tools that they understand are 
used to mark the creation of a legal obligation, as well as a normative call for 
such development. Critically, d’Aspremont’s emphasis is on language’s power to 
mark legal obligation, rather than other possible markers such as compliance 
with formal procedures. As an example of a formal linguistic indicator, 
d’Aspremont offers the ritualistic language used in Security Council resolutions 
that create binding obligations under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations. There, the Security Council intones that there has been a breach of or 
threat to international peace and security, invokes Chapter VII, and then 
‘decides’ upon the obligations imposed on members.29 These kinds of ritualistic 
linguistic indicators, understood by the legal community to connote the creation 
of a legal obligation, provide a pedigree that can be evaluated objectively to 
determine whether an instrument in fact creates binding legal obligations. 
D’Aspremont acknowledges that states already pay a great deal of attention to 
linguistic indicators of their intent to be legally bound by an agreement, citing in 
particular the Copenhagen Accord30 as an example of an instrument in which 
states clearly signalled the political nature of the instrument.31 The list of 
examples of international instruments that are clearly not intended to be legally 
binding could easily be expanded to include, to name but a very few: the  
Basel Accords on Capital Adequacy (‘Basel Accords’);32 the Nuclear Suppliers 
                                                 
 25 Ibid 12: ‘this book … seeks to demonstrate that written linguistic indicators should play the 
predominant role in the ascertainment of international legal rules’. 
 26 Ibid 197. 
 27 Ibid 200. See generally Norman Malcolm, Nothing is Hidden: Wittgenstein’s Criticism of 
His Early Thought (Blackwell, 1986); Dennis Patterson, ‘Law’s Pragmatism: Law as 
Practice and Narrative’ in Dennis Patterson (ed), Wittgenstein and Legal Theory  
(Westview, 1992) 85, 86. 
 28 D’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law, above n 7, 200. 
 29 Ibid 190. 
 30 Conference of the Parties, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Report of the Parties on its Fifteenth Session, Held in Copenhagen from 7 to 19 December 
2009 — Addendum — Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at Its 
Fifteenth Session, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (30 March 2010). 
 31 D’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law, above n 7, 183 n 190.  
 32 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III: International Framework for Liquidity 
Risk Management, Standards and Monitoring (Bank for International Settlements, 2010); 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for 
More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems (Bank for International Settlements, 2011). 
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Group Guidelines;33 the Rio+20 Declaration;34 and various memoranda of 
understanding on cooperation between, for example, national antitrust 
authorities.35 
Yet d’Aspremont is correct to note that ambiguity plagues a variety of 
contemporary instruments. Perhaps the clearest example is the decisions of 
Conferences of the Parties (‘COP’) to various treaties that appear to extend 
beyond the lawmaking authority granted to the COP. For example, the  
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (‘Kyoto Protocol’)36 specifies that any compliance mechanism resulting 
in binding legal consequences must be adopted by means of a formal amendment 
to the Protocol. Yet the Kyoto Compliance Mechanism,37 which contemplates 
imposing penalties such as reduced emissions limits in future emissions 
reductions agreements, was adopted by a simple decision of the parties. 
Similarly, the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora (‘CITES’) endows the COP with the ability, among other 
things, to ‘make recommendations for improving the effectiveness of CITES’.38 
Since ‘recommendations’ are not legally binding, this authority would appear to 
authorise the COP to do little more of a legally binding nature than subject 
species to the strict trade controls spelled out in CITES for species listed in 
Appendix I,39 or the slightly less strict controls that apply to Appendix II 
species.40 Despite this paucity of legal mandate, the CITES COP has erected a 
complicated compliance mechanism in which roles are assigned to the COP itself 
                                                 
 33 Nuclear Suppliers Group, Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers,  
IAEA Doc INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part1 (July 2011); Nuclear Suppliers Group, Guidelines 
for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software and Related 
Technology IAEA Doc INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part1 (June 2010). 
 34 The Future We Want, GA Res 66/288, UN GAOR 66th sess, 123rd plen mtg,  
Agenda Item 19, UN Doc A/RES/66/288 (11 September 2012).  
 35 See, eg, Memorandum of Understanding on Antitrust Cooperation between the United 
States Department of Justice and the United States Federal Trade Commission, and the 
Ministry of Corporate Affairs (Government of India) and the Competition Committee of 
India, signed and entered into force 27 September 2012 <http://www.ftc.gov/oia 
/agreements/1209indiamou.pdf>. 
 36 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened 
for signature 16 March 1998, 2303 UNTS 148 (entered into force 16 February 2005) 
(‘Kyoto Protocol’). 
 37 Conference of the Parties, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Report of the Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on Its First Session, Held in 
Montreal from 28 November to 10 December 2005 — Addendum — Part Two: Action Taken 
by the Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol at Its First Session,  
UN Doc FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3 (30 March 2006) Decision 27/CMP.1 (‘Procedures 
and Mechanisms relating to Compliance under the Kyoto Protocol’): compliance with the 
Kyoto Protocol is handled by the Compliance Committee.  
 38 Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 
opened for signature 3 March 1973, 993 UNTS 244 (entered into force 1 July 1975) art XI 
(‘CITES’). The Conference of the Parties’ other powers are primarily administrative in 
nature, such as making provisions for the Secretariat’s operation.  
 39 Ibid art III.  
 40 Ibid art IV. 
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and a body created by the COP, referred to as the Standing Committee.41 The 
compliance mechanism can result in ‘recommendations’ from the Standing 
Committee to the Parties to suspend trade with a particular party if they are in the 
view of the Standing Committee violating CITES either in the way it administers 
the Convention’s trade controls or by failing to file reports CITES mandates.42 
These compliance procedures appear not to be legally binding due to the absence 
of treaty authorisation for the COP to impose binding consequences. They are, 
however, adopted by the COP in accordance with a legislative process and result 
in real-world consequences that prompt changes in state behaviour, facts that 
muddy the legal status of the CITES compliance mechanism.43  
Ambiguity as to whether an instrument is legally binding is, in d’Aspremont’s 
view, a product of international law’s traditional reliance on parties’ intent, an 
insufficiently formal criterion that gives rise to indeterminacy about whether an 
instrument is in fact legally binding.44 Intent is ‘a fickle and indiscernible 
psychological element’.45 Resort to intent as the ultimate indicium of 
bindingness in international law thus introduces into treaties one of the main 
problems with customary law — the difficulty of ascertaining the psychological 
state of complex organisations. The problems of indeterminacy are compounded 
when one moves beyond written international instruments. D’Aspremont claims 
that unwritten legal rules are currently not subject to formal law-ascertainment.46 
In his view, the indeterminacy that has plagued debates about customary 
international law can be traced to the informal criteria that are used to identify 
custom.47 Moreover, while oral treaties and promises could in principle be 
identified using formal linguistic indicators, in practice they have tended to turn 
on the non-formal criterion of the intent of the parties, making distinction 
between binding oral promises and mere political statements difficult.48 
D’Aspremont argues that substituting written indicators for intent goes a long 
way towards providing a solution to the indeterminacy that exists in identifying 
legal rules.49 Although he suggests that the creation of a legal obligation through 
formal procedures could also play a role in formal law-identification, the resort 
                                                 
 41 Conference of the Parties, Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora, ‘Decisions of the Conference of the Parties to CITES in Effect after 
the 12th Meeting’ (CITES Decisions, 3–15 November 2002) [12.84]; Conference of the 
Parties, Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora, ‘Decisions of the Conference of the Parties to CITES in Effect after the 14th Meeting’ 
(CITES Decisions, 3–15 June 2007) [14.3]. 
 42 See David Hunter, James Salzman and Durwood Zaelke, International Environmental Law 
and Policy (Foundation Press, 4th ed, 2011) 1079 (discussing the CITES compliance 
mechanism). 
 43 Ibid 1079 (describing how the possibility of trade sanctions imposed through the CITES 
compliance process prompted Dominica, Rwanda and Vanuatu to come into compliance 
with their reporting obligations). 
 44 D’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law, above n 7, 178–82. 
 45 Ibid 180. 
 46 See ibid ch 7. 
 47 Ibid 162–70. 
 48 Ibid 171–3. 
 49 Ibid 185–6. See also at 182–3: d’Aspremont acknowledges that the process of identifying 
intent has itself been subjected to formal identification through the use of procedural devices 
but, as discussed above, does not believe that these procedural indicators have gone far 
enough in resolving ambiguity about whether an obligation is binding. 
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to written indicators does not require formal procedures.50 As the discussion 
regarding legislative decision-making by COPs indicates, there is wisdom in 
d’Aspremont’s view on the limits of procedures to mark formal lawmaking. 
Procedures, such as bicameralism and presentment to create a statute or  
notice-and-comment rulemaking by agencies in the United States, are commonly 
used as a formal marker of the creation of a legal obligation in domestic 
contexts.51 But the creative use of legislative bodies in international law to 
effectively amend treaties without formal amendment calls into question whether 
procedures can play the same role in international law. The institutions states 
create to engage in norm-production do not feel compelled to adhere tightly to 
the procedures of rulemaking spelled out in their constitutive treaties and yet, in 
the case of the compliance systems of the Kyoto Protocol and CITES, states 
appear to treat certain of these instruments as if they are legally binding. 
D’Aspremont also recognises that the use of written linguistic indicators 
cannot totally eliminate indeterminacy in law-identification.52 Indeed, its success 
in introducing determinacy is contingent on the convergence of social practices 
among law-applying authorities, an empirical fact that it is by no means clear 
exists.53 Indeed, Harlan Cohen has argued that the fragmentation of international 
law is not the product of conflicting legal rules, but rather the product of 
disagreement about the sources of law itself,54 a point that d’Aspremont 
acknowledges.55 If Cohen is correct, it is not clear that formalism offers any 
greater respite from the indeterminacy of international law-identification than 
deformalised criteria. D’Aspremont attempts to elude this difficulty by making 
two moves. First, he argues that perfect convergence in social practices is not 
necessary, but rather only a ‘feeling’ that law-applying authorities are speaking 
the same language.56 While one can sympathise with d’Aspremont’s intuition 
that perfect convergence is not necessary, the notion of a ‘feeling’ of 
commonality seems somewhat underspecified. 
Secondly, acknowledging the questionable empirical basis for a convergence 
of social practice among international lawyers, d’Aspremont calls for a greater 
‘social consciousness’ among law-applying authorities.57 He places particular 
emphasis on the role of informal cooperation and networks among international 
judges and tribunals.58 Judicial dialogue can promote the social consciousness 
                                                 
 50 Ibid 189. 
 51 United States Constitution art I § 7. 
 52 D’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law, above n 7, 189. 
 53 Ibid 197: ‘Short of any convergence, lawyers end up speaking different languages, thereby 
depriving law of any normativity’. 
 54 Harlan Grant Cohen, ‘Finding International Law, Part II: Our Fragmenting Legal 
Community’ (2012) 44 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 
1050. 
 55 D’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law, above n 7, 34: ‘It is as if 
the international legal scholarship had turned into a cluster of different scholarly 
communities, each of them using different criteria for the ascertainment of international 
legal rules’. 
 56 Ibid 201.  
 57 Ibid 213. 
 58 Ibid 213–14.  
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required to sustain the book’s approach to formalism, and so d’Aspremont urges 
greater attention to the interaction between international tribunals and judges.59 
D’Aspremont’s theory of formal law-ascertainment can thus be divided into 
its descriptive and its normative components. Descriptively, he offers a 
revitalised version of formalism, based on Hart’s social thesis, in which the 
convergence of practice among international legal actors leads to linguistic 
indicators that become focal points for states in identifying the legal significance 
of international instruments.60 Normatively, d’Aspremont calls for greater 
convergence in the use of linguistic indicators, for the primacy of linguistic 
indicators over other possible law-identifying criteria, for the use of linguistic 
indicators to police the boundaries between law and non-law and ultimately for 
the conscious development of a common legal language of commitment. 
III A COMMUNICATIVE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
In this Part, I discuss the implications of institutionalist theories of 
international law for d’Aspremont’s theory, and in turn the contribution of his 
theory of law-ascertainment to institutionalist theories. Institutionalism is a 
school of thought originating in international relations that studies the ways in 
which states use international institutions to facilitate cooperation. At its base, 
institutionalism is a behavioural school of thought, asking how international 
institutions change patterns of state conduct.61 Although law is only one 
institution of interest to international relations scholars, legal scholars have in 
recent years borrowed the insights from institutionalist theory to explain why 
international legal institutions look as they do and when we can expect 
international law to generate compliance and change state behaviour.62 
It might seem that institutionalist theories of international law are far afield 
from a study of the formal ascertainment of legal rules. However d’Aspremont’s 
defence of formalism is based on an argument that formalism in  
law-identification and a sharp bifurcation between law and non-law is necessary 
to maintain law’s ability to change behaviour. His defence thus invites dialogue 
with other behavioural theories of international law. As I shall argue below, I 
believe the dialogue to be very fruitful for both institutionalist theories of 
international law and for d’Aspremont’s own theory. 
                                                 
 59 Ibid 214. 
 60 See, eg, ibid 16. 
 61 See, eg, Barbara Koremenos, ‘Institutionalism and International Law’ in Jeffrey L Dunoff 
and Mark A Pollack (eds), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law  
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 62 To name but a very few, see Andrew Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational 
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A  A Need for Formalism? 
Institutionalist theories of international law hold that international law can 
generate changes by reducing transaction costs to negotiation, facilitating 
informational exchange and reducing uncertainty, and providing monitoring and 
enforcement procedures and tools that increase sanctions for violations of legal 
rules.63 Sanctions are critical for such theories because they provide incentives to 
change state behaviour. Institutions allow states to commit to abiding by rules by 
making sanctions for violation more likely. There are roughly speaking three 
different kinds of sanctions: retaliatory, reciprocal and reputational.64 Retaliatory 
sanctions are imposed in response to a breach of an obligation but the sanction 
need not be related to the obligation breached. Classic examples include military 
or economic sanctions. Reciprocal sanctions are imposed when a state ceases to 
comply with its own obligations under a legal rule because another state has 
breached an obligation. Finally, reputational sanctions are imposed when a state 
changes its view of how likely another state is to honour its obligations in the 
future. Such changes in reputation are costly because states with poor reputations 
may be excluded from international agreements or may have to offer greater 
concessions in order to induce other states to risk an agreement with them.65 Of 
course, states can impose sanctions simply to try to change another state’s 
behaviour. The key for institutionalist theories of law is that the existence of a 
legal obligation makes sanctions more likely by, for example, lowering the cost 
of a sanctioning state imposing retaliatory sanctions or by authorising reciprocal 
withdrawal from a treaty that has been breached by the other party. This 
marginal increase in the incentive to comply with a legal rule, owing to the 
increased possibility of being sanctioned, provides international law’s 
‘compliance pull’. Reputational sanctions are especially important for 
institutionalist theories of international law because, unlike other kinds of 
sanctions, they are costless to impose and are thus the most frequently applied 
kind of sanction.66 
Institutionalist theories of international law call into question d’Aspremont’s 
assertion that making international law effective requires a sharp distinction 
between law and non-law that is policed with formal indicators.67 Institutionalist 
theories, particularly reputational accounts, explain how much of the variation in 
formality and bindingness we observe in international legal ordering enhances 
the ability of states to cooperate. In particular, reputational theories explain how 
soft law — norms that are neither binding law nor purely political agreement, but 
have some lesser legal consequences — can improve the effectiveness of law. 
                                                 
 63 See, eg, Koremenos, above n 61.  
 64 See, eg, Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory, above n 62,  
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 65 Ibid ch 3. 
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There are at least two ways in which soft law increases the effectiveness of 
international law. 
First, soft law expands the range of instruments available to states and 
therefore makes regulation of certain topics more likely and may indeed make 
stricter regulation of certain areas possible. Variation in degrees of legality 
allows states to signal to each other the likelihood they will comply with an 
obligation. It allows them, in other words, to control the expectations of other 
states that determine the kinds of sanctions they face for violating a legal 
obligation. When a state makes a legal commitment, it pledges its reputation for 
complying with legal rules. If it makes a promise and fails to abide by that 
promise, the state suffers reputational harm that may hurt its ability to cooperate 
in the future. States thus have an incentive to be truthful about the likelihood 
they will comply with an obligation. 
States develop levels of commitment in order to calibrate the expectations of 
their partners. Commitments that do not rise to the level of a binding obligation 
entail less of a pledge of reputational capital, and therefore less of a sanction in 
the event of a violation. In a sense, the difference between legally binding 
commitments in treaties and informal or soft law pledges is the difference 
between saying ‘I shall arrive for dinner at six’ as opposed to ‘I hope to arrive at 
dinner by six’. The former connotes certainty on the part of the speaker and 
therefore creates firmer expectations in the mind of the hearer than does the latter 
statement. In the case of the former statement, if the declarant fails to arrive at 
six the hearer is more likely to reassess the credibility of the declarant’s 
statements. In short, the hearer is more likely to be disappointed (and perhaps to 
rethink the guest list for future dinners) because the declarant raised his 
expectations. 
Having a menu of commitment levels is valuable to states because it allows 
them to reduce the costs of violations that are unavoidable,68 may facilitate 
renegotiation in areas of the law that are rapidly changing,69 may allow states to 
broaden the reach of norms beyond those states who have formally consented to 
the norm70 and creates an opportunity for states to engage in dynamic 
contestation of legal norms.71 These benefits, in turn, increase the ability of 
states to cooperate, a crucial goal of legal ordering. Faced with a binary decision 
between law and non-law, states might well choose to forego legal commitments 
entirely to save, for example, renegotiation costs incurred in a fast-changing area 
like international financial law. In so doing, of course, these states would also 
forego the benefits of cooperation that arise from negotiating soft law 
instruments such as the Basel Accords. Moreover, states may be willing to make 
stricter soft law commitments rather than hard law commitments because the 
costs of violation are lower if they fail to live up to the stricter standards.72 
                                                 
 68 Andrew Guzman, ‘The Design of International Agreements’ (2005) 16 European Journal of 
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Whatever problems it may create for courts trying to apply the law, this variety 
lubricates international bargaining by giving states more choices when designing 
international agreements. 
Secondly, d’Aspremont assumes that clarity about the legal effect of a rule is 
a virtue from the standpoint of effectiveness. This assumption is common in 
international legal scholarship. The managerialist school, for example, has, at its 
base, assumed that states have a predisposition to comply with international 
law.73 On this account, most non-compliance with international law can be 
traced to ambiguity and indeterminacy, as well as informational problems and 
resource constraints.74 Clarification of legal rules and increased transparency in 
legal process are cures for these compliance ills. 
But ambiguity and indeterminacy have a number of benefits that are 
frequently overlooked, making the claim that clarification of a norm’s legal 
status (and therefore a formalist approach aimed at such clarification) is a 
desirable one that might deserve a more robust defence than that given it by 
d’Aspremont. The benefits of ambiguity and indeterminacy of legal rules flow 
from the effects on behaviour of uncertainty about what will be considered 
compliance. Behavioural studies have shown that under certain conditions, such 
as where individuals are risk averse or have a predisposition to comply with the 
law, a lack of clarity as to what the law requires can enhance efforts to comply 
with the law.75 The logic behind this counterintuitive finding is that individuals 
will make extra efforts to ensure they are compliant when what counts as 
compliance is unclear. They will leave themselves a margin of error. Providing 
clarity in what the law requires removes the need for this margin. Even 
individuals predisposed to comply with the law need only make the minimum 
effort necessary to comply. Extending this logic to states suggests that the 
managerialist account of the need for clarity in the law is backwards. If states 
truly have a predisposition to comply with the law (one that is independent of the 
sanctions they face for violation), then clarity may reduce their efforts to comply, 
thereby reducing the effectiveness of the law in changing state behaviour. 
Beyond the benefits of ambiguity, dynamism in the law (with the associated 
lack of clarity) and in legal language also has benefits that are lost in a formalist 
approach to law-identification. As d’Aspremont notes, international law has seen 
an explosion in the numbers of actors claiming authority in the international legal 
system.76 Moreover, international law has changed its approach to the 
relationship between states and individuals. Investment law (under investment 
treaties) now accords corporations the right to bring direct causes of action 
against states,77 and human rights law has evolved to regulate the purely internal 
                                                 
 73 See, eg, Chayes and Handler Chayes, above n 12. 
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 75 See, eg, John E Calfee and Richard Craswell, ‘Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance 
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conduct by a state towards its own citizens,78 something largely unthinkable a 
hundred years ago. Many scholars, including d’Aspremont, have noted that this 
shift has been accompanied by greater variation in the kinds of criteria that legal 
actors apply in determining whether an instrument creates legal obligations.79 
D’Aspremont’s theory is, of course, a reaction to this underlying fragmentation 
of sources doctrine.80 D’Aspremont recognises that international law, and 
particularly the lawmaking process, is much more dynamic that the formal 
approach he advocates would suggest.81 Formalism is useful, he argues, chiefly 
for the exercise of law-identification. 
But I doubt that d’Aspremont’s theory can be so neatly cabined. The 
identification of formal indicators through resort to community consensus about 
legal language implies a dynamism to d’Aspremont’s approach to formalism that 
belies his call for a greater convergence in legal language among law-applying 
authorities. Languages, after all, are constantly evolving to express new ideas 
and sentiments. It should hardly be surprising, given the radical changes in how 
international law regulates states and in particular the relationship between states 
and non-state actors discussed above, that legal language would also change and 
perhaps fragment. Put differently, d’Aspremont’s normative call for convergence 
on the use of legal language in the process of law-identification is somewhat at 
odds with the descriptive aspects of his theory. Consensus about the meaning of 
legal terminology can form and dissolve over time. This dynamism and the 
ambiguity it produces at times, even just at the level of law-identification, seems 
valuable insofar as it allows the doctrine of sources to evolve to take into account 
international law’s contemporary challenges. 
Finally, although assessing compliance in order to apply sanctions is critical 
to an institutionalist theory of international law, there is really only one kind of 
actor in the international system that is required to resolve with clarity the 
question of whether a law has been complied with (and thus whether an 
instrument creates legal obligations): international tribunals. States and 
negotiators can proceed to bargain over the resolution of a dispute without ever 
resolving some underlying uncertainty about whether a legal obligation exists. 
But in the process of resolving disputes, courts are tasked with making binary 
determinations as to who is right and wrong in a dispute and in what ways. A 
theory of the law that caters to or privileges this need of tribunals might be 
termed an adjudicative theory of law.82 D’Aspremont’s theory is based on such 
an adjudicative understanding of international law. In his view, ‘there is no doubt 
that the central law-applying authority whose behaviour is the most instrumental 
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in defining the standard of law-ascertainment is the International Court of 
Justice’.83 
Yet this pride of place accorded the ICJ (and after the ICJ, other tribunals) 
overlooks the fact that much of international practice still occurs outside of the 
shadow of international tribunals. International disputes are still regularly 
resolved, not by resort to formal courts, but through negotiated resolutions that 
provide the basis for future legal claims.84 In short, much of international law 
remains directly under the control of states. States keep track of and publicise 
their own practices in order to communicate to each other their beliefs about 
what the law requires — beliefs that are played out in a variety of interactions far 
away from The Hague. The US Department of State, for example, annually 
publishes the Digest of the United States Practice in International Law.85 
Moreover, much of the contestation over international legal process is about 
defining what those obligations are in the first place. States are simultaneously 
the subjects and creators of international law. In the latter role, they are 
constantly renegotiating the terms of their commitments to each other. In doing 
so, they apply the law because the law shapes their bargaining positions. But 
formal law-ascertainment criteria are less important where this latter task is 
concerned.86 Instead of being concerned with the mechanical task of categorising 
the kinds of commitments states have made to each other in the past, states are 
concerned with defining their obligations going forward. Such a task can 
accommodate some uncertainty as to the legal status of the obligations being 
debated. Certainty is but a means, and far from the only one, to the end of a 
negotiated resolution. Indeed, many international disputes recognise this reality 
explicitly, setting parameters for state negotiations rather than declaring firmly a 
resolution to a particular dispute.87 
B  Communication and Expectations 
Institutionalist theories of law thus offer an explanation for why the existence 
of quasi-legal norms and, similarly, ambiguity about the legality of a norm, may 
be desirable from a behavioural perspective. The existence of quasi-legal norms 
may allow states to regulate some areas that would be unregulated in a world in 
which states could only choose between binding and non-binding agreements. 
Moreover, ambiguity may in certain instances increase compliance efforts.  
Yet institutionalist theories do not specify precisely how states go about 
signalling their desired level of commitment in an instrument. They assume that 
there are binding commitments, soft law commitments, and purely political 
                                                 
 83 D’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law, above n 7, 205.  
 84 For a theory of international law’s evolution in response to negotiated resolutions of claims, 
see Anthony D’Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law (Cornell University 
Press, 1971) 92–8. 
 85 CarrieLyn D Guymon (ed), ‘Digest of United States Practice in International Law 2011’ 
(United States Department of State, 2011). 
 86 This is not to say that having a theory of what constitutes a legally binding obligation — that 
is, a theory of the pure type — is not important. Such a theory provides a measuring stick by 
which to judge the legality of different kinds of instruments. I mean only to say that the 
approach to determining what constitutes a legally binding obligation need not be devoid of 
uncertainty. 
 87 Gabc̆íkovo–Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) (Judgment) [1997] ICJ Rep 7,  
78–9 [141]–[142]. 
16 Melbourne Journal of International Law [Vol 13 
 
commitments, but offer at best a thin description of how states distinguish 
between these different categories. These theories, in other words, tend to 
assume flawless communication between states, rather than exploring how states 
in fact communicate their desired level of commitment.88 States do not 
communicate with each other without error, however. What one state believes it 
is signalling is not necessarily what another states hears. Institutionalist theories 
thus require an account of how states indicate the level of commitment 
associated with a particular legal instrument. 
Enter d’Aspremont’s theory of law-identification. One of the key 
contributions of d’Aspremont’s theory is the recognition that treaty law has 
remained beholden to the psychological notion of ‘the intent of the parties’.89 
The reasons for this allegiance stem from the contractual nature of international 
agreements, as well as a more general concern about sovereignty that permeates 
certain quarters in international law. A fidelity to the intent of the parties 
vindicates a respect for sovereignty because it ultimately leaves the control of 
what obligations bind a state in that state’s own hands. 
But the intent of the parties is at best secondarily relevant once we consider a 
theory of international law based on incentives to comply. An institutionalist 
account of international law — one that emphasises how international legal 
institutions change the incentives for state behaviour by creating sanctions for 
deviating from legal rules — cares not about the intent of a party when it gives 
its consent to be bound to an obligation. Rather, it cares about the expectations 
that are created in the parties that will apply future sanctions. When those 
expectations are disappointed, sanctions (reputational or otherwise) are applied. 
Once a legal obligation is created, a state bases its future behaviour on the 
expectations of other states because those expectations — and not the state’s 
intent when it entered into the legal commitment — determine the kinds of 
penalties the state will face. Intent, of course, remains relevant insofar as a state 
has an incentive to set the expectations of other states in line with its own 
intentions. But on this account what matters it not intent per se. Rather, it is how 
intent is communicated and perceived by other states. 
This insight is critical. Theories of international law, particularly theories of 
customary international law, have focused on opinio juris, the psychological 
component of the law.90 Yet institutionalism’s focus on expectations as the basis 
for sanctions makes clear that international law is most likely to be effective in 
generating behavioural change, not when states act out of a sense of legal 
obligation, but rather when there are shared expectations about the kinds of 
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obligations created by an instrument and what the instrument requires of states. 
D’Aspremont’s theory thus very helpfully provides a jurisprudential 
underpinning for institutionalism’s focus on expectations rather than intent. At 
the same time, it provides institutionalist scholars with an empirical field of 
study: the comparative use of language in written instruments across time and 
fields. A communicative theory of international law would seek to explain the 
development and use of legal language across regions, substantive legal fields 
and in different kinds of legal instruments. 
Effective communication requires a common legal language, the development 
of which d’Aspremont’s version of the social thesis can explain. A common 
legal language allows the intentions of one party to be translated into the 
expectations of other parties. As d’Aspremont points out and as discussed above, 
the indicators currently in existence do not rid us of indeterminacy entirely. Nor, 
as I have argued, is it clear that zero is the optimal amount of indeterminacy 
about what constitutes a legal obligation. Nevertheless, a communicative theory 
of international law grounded in the institutionalist logic of sanctions does 
require some minimum level of ability to communicate to translate the intentions 
of one party into the expectations of others. 
Of course, many of these formal indicators in fact exist. For example, 
denoting an instrument as an ‘agreement’ suggests the instrument is binding; 
denoting an instrument as a ‘memorandum of understanding’ suggests it is not. 
Referring to the signatories to an instrument as ‘parties’ suggests the instrument 
is binding; referring to them as ‘participants’ suggests it is not. At the level of 
individual obligations, ‘shall’ connotes a binding obligation, while ‘should’ 
indicates a non-binding obligation. 
But we would not expect the development of this common language to stop at 
linguistic indicators marking the distinction between law and non-law, 
d’Aspremont’s focus. Instead, based on the need to signal variation in 
commitment levels, one might predict that states would develop a robust set of 
linguistic indicators that allow them to calibrate the level of commitment 
associated with a particular obligation. For example, one of the key attributes of 
soft law obligations is that they are not purely political commitments. Rather, 
they have some quasi-legal attribute: they implicate in some way a state’s 
reputation for complying with its legal obligations. But what sort of linguistic 
indicators mark these kinds of obligations and distinguish them both from 
binding obligations and from purely political commitments? Can evidence for 
the existence and importance of soft law be found in the use of language in 
international instruments? 
One possible indicator is a textual reference to a binding legal obligation, 
indicating that states view the soft law obligations as related to binding legal 
obligations. This relationship distinguishes the soft law obligation from the 
purely political one. By including a reference to a binding legal obligation in an 
otherwise non-binding instrument, states signal to each other that they view the 
obligations therein as more than purely political commitments. Moreover, tracing 
the textual references between different kinds of instruments might allow 
scholars to develop a typology of different kinds of instruments based on 
linguistic usage. Instruments that are more closely associated with clearly 
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binding legal instruments might be more frequently invoked by states both in 
judicial proceedings as well as in diplomatic correspondence. 
More generally, a communicative theory of international law opens a 
potentially fruitful line of research into how language is used in different legal 
communities. If, as I have suggested above, the legal language states use to mark 
different levels of legal agreement is dynamic, then the use of legal language in 
instruments across time, regions and substantive fields may shed light on 
underlying patterns of international lawmaking. Variation between, for example, 
the way in which linguistic indicators are used in human rights law versus trade 
law may indicate that specialisation in international law has in fact produced 
distinct legal communities. Such a finding would have significant implications 
for how we think about the fragmentation of international law,91 as well for 
reputational accounts of international law, where one of the central questions is 
whether states have a single reputation for compliance or have multiple 
reputations based on issue area.92 In conjunction with a more nuanced typology 
of different levels of commitment based on linguistic indicators and  
cross-references to other instruments, scholars might be able to map the relative 
legalisation of international relations across time, issue area and geography. 
IV CONCLUSION 
In the tale of the Tower of Babel, the people of the earth are said to have 
spoken a common language. Because of their ability to communicate with each 
other, there were no limits to their potential and they settled in a plain to build a 
city and tower that would reach to the heavens. Displeased, God shattered their 
unified language and scattered them across the earth. In many ways, the story of 
Babel captures the hopes and fears of international lawyers. If international law 
speaks with a common voice, it offers the possibility of cooperative solutions to 
some of the world’s most vexing problems. But if lawyers fail to speak in one 
tongue, international law loses its force and nations may be scattered.93 
In Formalism and the Sources of International Law, d’Aspremont has offered 
one of the most insightful defences of this view in many years. He skilfully 
shows how a common legal language can emerge to delineate the multitude of 
international instruments those which give rise to legal obligations from those 
which do not. Moreover, he has offered a thoughtful defence of the virtue of 
developing this common legal language for the purpose of marking the boundary 
between the legal and the non-legal, between law and politics. 
Languages are constantly changing, however, and pushing for unity of 
language has costs. Changes in languages happen for important reasons. 
Underlying ideas change and the speakers — the participants in the legal  
system — also change over time. Moreover, more varied language and more 
varied law increases the ability of international legal actors, most importantly 
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states, to tailor the level of commitment in their rules to the specific nature of the 
problem in question. There is no doubt that pluralism in international legal 
sources comes with costs and creates confusion. At the same time, however, this 
increase in language also creates the possibility of order where there would only 
be anarchy, of cooperation where a bifurcated world of law and non-law would 
relegate certain matters to pure politics. 
At the same time, d’Aspremont’s theory of linguistic indicators in 
international law has opened a potentially fruitful avenue of research for 
international lawyers. His descriptive account of how linguistic indicators can 
provide a common set of expectations offers jurisprudential micro-foundations 
for institutionalist theories of international law that rely on expectations — rather 
than the well-worn concept of intent — to impose the sanctions that make 
international law effective. A robust study of the language of international law 
and, in particular, how uses in language converge and diverge across time and 
issue areas might well help explain much of the dynamism in international law 
that has characterised the last century. 
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